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SUMMARY
The paper examines the data collected through interviews with 50 highly edu-
cated returnees from Serbia, carried out in 2017. The main objective was to un-
derstand the personal and group identities of Serbian citizens with an experience 
of migration. The authors applied two conceptual paradigms: first, a primordial 
one, presupposing that migrants fully preserve their national identity despite be-
ing exposed to different cultures, customs, and values at the destination. The sec-
ond is a social constructionist one, which is further delineated into two main lines 
of thought: the one assumes that migrants maintain national identity as a “hard 
core”, yet in a continuous process of remaking/recreation as a result of embracing 
transnational ties. The other which presupposes that migrants build hybrid identi-
ties in a permanent flux because they are not firmly grounded in any specific cul-
ture. The interpretation of results indicated that a vast majority of returnees have 
devised hybrid identities. This means that destination society and culture have 
significantly effected their identity but national roots have still been preserved. 
The latter is mirrored in their strong sense of belonging to the nation. This may 
be interpreted as a consequence of two main circumstances. It is hard to expect 
that national identity can remain unmodified when migrants enrol in educational 
institutions and bond with scholars all over the world. Besides, the very fact of 
having maintained national identity made them willing to return and contribute to 
homeland development, despite Serbia’s lagging behind the social and economic 
developments of countries they had been living in. The results also revealed that 
the interviewees did not perceive any major difference in national belonging be-
tween themselves and non-migrants in Serbia. On the contrary, they did perceive 
this difference when it came to the diaspora.
KEY WORDS: identity, diaspora, transnationalism, highly educated returnees, Ser-
bia
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INTRODUCTION
The interest in identity can be traced back to ancient philosophers, primar-
ily Plato and Aristotle. It can be said that, aside from other topics and prob-
lems, the whole history of philosophy has been permeated with this issue. 
Nonetheless, while the very meaning and essence of this concept have been 
constantly evolving (Đurić, 2009), its contemporary understanding stems 
from Western individualism.
The rejection of both the traditional and Christian worldviews in the 18th 
century was followed by a search for a new, secular identity. The tension 
between the human being and society advanced in the 19th century. Both 
the individuals and groups expressed a strong tendency to differentiate 
themselves from others, thus striving for uniqueness. This individualism 
came further to the fore during postmodernism and has become ever more 
empowered by the recent globalisation (Golubović, 1999: 7).
Other than boosting the global economy, the last wave of globalisation has 
enabled a free flow of people and ideas owing to the widespread and open 
use of information technology by the vast majority of people. The plurality 
of choices and chances provides possibilities for building various identities 
and creating authenticity, which has come to the fore ever since the rejection 
of the ideals of traditional society. However, the abundance of open pros-
pects, unknown to traditional societies and their value systems, has brought 
about feelings of alienation and insecurity. Bolstering ethnic and national 
identity as firm footholds has become one of the not so infrequent reactions 
(Takeyuki, 2001). These identities have multiplied in today’s world despite 
many attempts to achieve cultural unification (Šolte, 2009).
The development of and access to contemporary means of communication 
have also influenced the identity formation of today’s migrants. Immigrant 
populations are expected to accept the customs and culture of a destination 
and gradually cut ties with the country of origin, thus becoming assimi-
lated into a new community. However, owing to the Internet and various 
programs that enable cheap interaction between migrants and their rela-
tives and friends staying behind, a change of residence does not necessar-
ily mean cutting ties with places and communities of belonging. Exchange 
with the homeland now occurs in transnational spaces, thus inducing the 
process of recreation of personal, as well as group, national identity (Glick 
Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992: 1). Besides, transnational spaces 
also facilitate the establishment of firm and stable networks at receiving 
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societies, thus shaping migrants’ lives even though their new and final des-
tination might be their very country of origin, as is the case with returnees 
(Takeyuki, 2001).
The main objective of this paper is to understand the feelings related to 
identity or the sense of belonging among returnees who either completed 
some level of education or worked abroad after graduating from universi-
ties in Serbia. The interpretation of results is based on the data collected 
through qualitative fieldwork with the main purpose of exploring possibili-
ties for mobilising returnees into homeland development.
It is important to stress that our fieldwork was not focused on identity. The 
study of its nature, characteristics, and significance for the respondents was 
carried out to test the hypothesis regarding the importance of national iden-
tity as an incentive to invest resources accumulated abroad into the home-
land. Besides, the creation of the instrument for data collection strongly 
relied on the main theoretical underpinnings, which made it possible to 
analyse the statements concerning personal identity. This theoretical frame-
work will be elaborated in the next chapter.
Having in mind the macro-structural theories which accentuate the con-
text as an important element in understanding the process of migration and 
identity (Cassarino, 2004), the third chapter provides a short review of the 
specific socio-political context in Serbia following the collapse of state so-
cialism and the onset of long-term post-socialist transformation, since these 
were the times when our respondents were leaving and later returning to 
the country. The fourth chapter lays down the research methodology and 
is followed by a discussion of the main findings. Finally, the last chapter 
presents some concluding remarks.
CONCEPTUALISATION
Beginning at the end of the 20th century, the new wave of globalisation has 
been characterised by a technical and information revolution, concomitant 
compression of time and space, the diffusion of the market economy, global 
corporations, etc. All of these factors have strongly impacted the issues of 
national identity. While the consequences of these trends are manifold, this 
paper will focus on the most important ones, such as the status of migrants 
at a destination, which influences the shaping of their identity and the per-
sistence of a particular national gradient within it.
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For authors whom David Held names hyperglobalists (Held and McGrew, 
1999),1 globalisation represents the implosion of national identities and spe-
cificities in a political as well as cultural and economic sense. However, the 
truth is that not only has globalisation failed to annihilate nation and na-
tional identity but it has also caused a burgeoning of local sentiments of 
belonging. It has also brought about a rise of collective identities beyond 
the national level, i.e. nationalist sentiments of people who do not possess 
their own states. The examples are numerous: Quebeck, Norway, Slova-
kia, Bangladesh, Chechnya, etc. (Pavković and Radan, 2008). Some authors 
claim that today’s globalisation denotes an era of revival of nationalisms, 
which is reflected in resistance to established nation-states (Bisley, 2007).
The strengthening of national identity is also a result of a personal identity 
crisis as a consequence of varying options and values provided by informa-
tion technology. Earlier, in traditional societies, people defined themselves 
by the roles they played within society, so their identity was vastly socially 
constructed. In modern times, each individual creates their own identity, 
choosing among a plurality of options and evaluating them in accordance 
to what Charles Taylor labelled as the ideal of authenticity (Golubović, 2009: 
11). Besides, one does not need spatial proximity to develop a group or col-
lective identity. Much more significance is gained through “…networks of 
interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of 
belonging” (Welman, 2001: 228). Thus, the evolution of information technol-
ogy brings about the privatisation of life (Bauman, 1994), marking a node 
of various overlapping communities based on virtual networks. Therefore, 
contemporary information and communication technologies lay a myriad 
of possibilities before a person, all of which are important for identity for-
mation and authenticity under particular social settings.
Identity building and social recognition are also related to anxiety, which 
has become one of the features of personality in modern times (Kelner, 
2004). This feeling of unease stems from the surplus of options, from the 
1 Having in mind the different approaches to globalisation, Held and McGrew (1999) di-
vided authors into three groups:
 1.  Hyperglobalists – those who see globalisation as a completely new era, which is characterised by 
global capitalism, global management, and global civil society. The basis for this understanding 
is that the decision centre is beyond the nation-state;
 2.  Sceptics – those who think that economic interdependency is anything but new. In that sense, it 
is more plausible to discuss globalization more as an integration of national states and less as an 
entirely integrated world economy; and
 3.  Transformationalists – those who believe globalisation is a long-term historical process with 
inherent contradictions, which depends on a series of factors.
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need for acknowledgement and appreciation of identity by others, and, 
finally, from the multitude of “we” identities, all of which pose a risk of 
losing oneself in a multitude of sometimes mutually conflicting roles. The 
result is a crisis of identity and a need for security.
It is exactly at this point when one starts to strive for a firm foothold, which 
may be found in national and ethnic identity. Common roots provide senti-
ments of stability, belonging and permanence both in individual life and 
in relationships with others (Golubović, 1999; Žižek, 2001). This need for 
a firm ground in the perception of self and others, which is evident in the 
sense of belonging to a group based on ethnic origin, myths, and collective 
memories (Smith, 2009), demonstrates the persistence of national identity 
and national communities despite all other influences present in the con-
temporary world. 
It is important to underline that these communities have always been im-
agined, meaning that people are aware that they cannot get to know other 
members. Rather, “in the minds of each lives the image of their commun-
ion” (Anderson, 1999: 49). As Anderson further claims, this communion 
could never be placed in the boundaries of one state, although it could be 
imagined in this way (Anderson, 1999). The latter has often been the case 
when attempting to understand international relations (Glick Schiller and 
Fouron, 1999). With the current phenomenon of widespread globalisation, 
as well as transnationalism, supranationalism and diaspora (Pries, 2005: 
175 – 182), it is indeed impossible to conceive all members of one nation in 
a single state. Since this seems to be obvious both to scholars and political 
stakeholders, this “methodological nationalism” was rejected (Glick Schil-
ler and Fouron, 1999). Today, the national community is understood as a 
network of individuals irrespective of their state of residence, the definition 
which can also be applied to the diaspora (Pries, 2005).
Contemporary technologies enable powerful states to exert their political 
and cultural influence on the rest of the world, which is reflected in the 
shaping and questioning of identities of non-migrants of various nationali-
ties, as well as in modifying the national identities of those who do not live 
in their countries of origin. The Internet permits mobiles to sustain every-
day relations with non-migrants in the homeland. In that way, there is no 
need to alter the feelings of core national belonging, either by their suppres-
sion or strengthening through nostalgia. New technologies enable migrants 
to retain bonds once established in other states and cultures upon their re-
turn, which affects the further shaping of divergent personal identities. This 
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phenomenon of maintaining social ties beyond the borders of a single state 
is known as transnationalism (Pries, 2005).
Yet, wide access to communication technology produces ambivalent out-
comes. It allows for an open future and a myriad of personal choices that 
alter the fixed core of sentiments linked to the idea of a nation. However, 
varied life trajectories in the current era of globalisation bring about the 
crisis of self, thereby underpinning national identity, which, contrary to 
expectations of hyperglobalists, has not been overcome, but instead, even 
more fortified. As Appadurai (1990) claims, the impact of globalisation on 
the national state and personal identity is much contested. Personal identity 
is explained by antagonistic views, especially the identity of migrants. In 
short, when it comes to the identity of migrants and diaspora, there are two 
main schools of thought:
1. Primordial, i.e. essentialist one – diaspora identity is seen as a purely 
national one in an ethnic or “demotic” sense, in line with Smith’s classifica-
tion based on ethnic origin, language, myths, and memories (Smith, 1998, 
2009). According to Šolte (2009), transnational communities and diaspora 
are manifestations of how national identity has been conserved in the era of 
globalisation. The author observes them as consequences of deterritoriali-
zation where the progress in both technology and communications caused 
the generation of a new form of national identity irrespective of the borders 
of a (national) state (Šolte, 2009).
The main reason to emphasise the national element while tackling the iden-
tity of the diaspora lies with the very definition of that concept. According 
to Brubaker (2005), “diaspora” presupposes not only spatial dispersion but 
also concentration in a destination country and (re)orientation towards the 
homeland. The same author claims that the diaspora maintains a national 
identity as a reaction to or a rejection of being assimilated into destination 
society, but as he highlights, this sentiment has to endure through many 
generations (Brubaker, 2005: 5). The identity of members of the diaspora 
has not been shaped by passive citizenship in the origin country as is the 
case with national identity, but by their affection for the homeland while 
living as passive citizens in some other society. “The diasporic people sur-
vive in a new environment while caring for their distant homeland” (Bra-
datan, Popan and Melton, 2010: 177). Their emotional life is absorbed by 
the origin place and they feel like refugees in the country of destination. 
Besides, they are not interested in interactions with citizens in the country 
of destination but are instead obsessed with the moment of return. Authors 
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advocating this standpoint reckon that immigrants create wholly isolated, 
homogenised ethnic groups denying any dissimilarities among their mem-
bers (Basar, 2015: 20). They all feel that they only belong to one place: the 
country they came from. The problem with this view is that it neglects the 
issues of personal choice when it comes to belonging, thus widely over-
looking the possibility of participating in (various) groups, although the 
latter presents the most important element of mobilising agency. Secondly, 
proposing total isolation of migrants in destination places and denying any 
influence of customs, values and cultural elements of local citizens seems 
rigid.
2. Opposed to the mentioned theoretical viewpoint is a group of authors 
in favour of constructionism, including Nina Glick Shiller, Steven Vertovec, 
and others (Bash, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Vertovec, 2001; 
Bauböck, 2010; Hall 1990). They claim that migrants are not necessarily fo-
cused either on the country of origin or to the destination but they might 
identify themselves with many places, communities, and societies. Thus, 
they can be “both here and there” while their belonging is essentially trans-
national. Glick Shiller considers that migrant identity is embedded in a net-
work of relationships that are created simultaneously in both the destination 
and origin societies (Bash, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). Similarly, 
Adamson reckons that the identity of the diaspora is a social construction 
made of transnational networks, experiences, and identifications, formed 
as a result of new advances in technology and communications (Adamson, 
2008). These experiences refer to various cultural, political, economic and 
historical conditions, as well as institutions and practices, which without 
doubt contribute to migrants’ identity formation (Christou, 2006: 19). Thus, 
when speaking of diaspora identity from this standpoint, it is the cultural 
change that is particularly emphasised, instead of its traditional content 
which is passed on from generation to generation in an unchanged form.
Extreme interpretations of the second viewpoint can be found with authors 
proposing hybrid diaspora identity (Chien-Hui Kuo, 2003; Korać, 2012; 
Bash, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton, 1994; Vertovec, 2001). They deny 
the existence of the “hard core” of identity and insist on permanent change 
(Bruneau, 2010: 37). The cultural mixing begins once a migrant has settled 
in a destination country and invokes the processes of integration into a new 
society. This brings about the adjustment of one’s homeland culture to the 
new one, its reconfiguration and the creation of a new, hybrid, mixed iden-
tity (Chambers, 1996: 50). In line with this standpoint, immigrants are con-
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nected with two places simultaneously, but they belong nowhere. That is 
why underscoring the very idea of a “space somewhere in between” seems 
important (Bhabha, 1990, 1994). This “in-between” space presupposes one 
core cultural narrative, producing a counter-narrative of a “third space”. By 
that token, people occupying the “third space” are indeed seen as cultural 
brokers, such as elite intellectuals whose hybrid artistic products are the 
focus of academic interest (Korać, 2012; Kalra, Kalhon and Hutynuk, 2005).
A somewhat different type of constructionist standpoint is represented 
by authors who maintain the “hard core” of national identity, but see it 
as permanently remaking and reshaping owing to the cultural influence 
of destination places and societies. Bauböck considers national identity the 
main factor for mobilising diaspora (Bauböck, 2010), preserved for genera-
tions and upgraded by impacts of other cultures. As such, this notion of 
migrants’ identity turns out to be an outcome of “roots and routes” (Gilroy, 
1991). Members of the diaspora coming from the same (national) state have 
the same descent, irrespectively of their place of settlement. However, dif-
ferences occur due to the effects of cultures and traditions they faced and 
exchanged during the course of mobility. Or, as Hall notices, “they bear 
upon them the traces of the particular cultures, traditions, languages, and 
histories by which they are shaped. The difference is that they are not and 
will never be unified in the old sense because they are irrevocably the prod-
uct of several interlocking histories and cultures, belonging at one and the 
same time to several ‘homes’” (Hall 1990: 310).
When speaking of the identity of returnees, it should also be underlined 
that it implies more of a process and less of a closed and intact quality. The 
culture, value system and customs of the local societies where a person was 
upbrought are going to be further moulded by influences of the culture and 
customs into which s/he has been integrated during the migration trajec-
tory. The very fact that migrants have experienced life in different states 
undermines the idea of homogenous group identity of returnees. This also 
applies to the diaspora. The myriads of identities of returnees could be clas-
sified in the following way:
1. Returnees – just like members of the diaspora – do not represent a ho-
mogenous group. Their identity has been built by combining “roots and 
routes”, thus producing wholly dissimilar individual identities. Since cur-
rent mobility assumes that more than two social systems will contribute to 
identity formation, the process of differentiation can be expected to become 
even more complex.
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2. In-between returnees and diaspora: although the very fact of residing in 
various states adds to modifications, the absence of nostalgia as a painful 
feeling of separateness from homeland profoundly distinguishes returnees 
from the diaspora. Still, these two groups have something in common other 
than roots. It is the experience of living in different states together with 
transnationalism in the sense of belonging to a wider, global community 
surpassing the borders of a (nation-) state (Vertovec, 1999) and not to be con-
strained by a national one. This implies that returnees do resume transna-
tional practices, which involve simultaneous social, political and economic 
activities in their homeland, which has become their (new) destination, and 
in former destination places/states. They also continue participating in the 
transnational diaspora, professional, interest, and other groups.
3. In-between returnees and non-migrants – the identity of returnees has 
been shaped by influences of other societies and transnationalism. Howev-
er, while direct exchange with foreign cultures is only related to migrants, 
transnational belonging is not their exclusive feature. With information 
technology and media, globalisation allows for the pursuit of transna-
tional orientation regardless of “corporal” mobility (Levitt, 2003). Just like 
members of the diaspora, who do not need to travel to their homeland to 
experience a sense of belonging, non-mobiles are not to be denied trans-
nationalism either (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). Still, the fact remains that 
differences between returnees and non-migrants are often acknowledged 
through sentiments of “otherness” which are glued to the first group upon 
their return (cf. Takeyuki, 2001). This might be the result of diverging norms 
in countries of origin and destination or changes which the homeland un-
derwent while migrants were away (De Bree, Davids and de Haas, 2010).
When speaking of the identity of both the diaspora and returnees, authors 
accentuate the dynamic side of the cultural aspect of national identity. 
However, some studies which tackled the functional role of national iden-
tity came to underline the political and territorial components as highly 
significant in the formation of personal identity (Baser, 2015; Šupule and 
Klave, 2018). In an interpretation of the role of the Turkish diaspora in the 
relations between Turks and Kurds in Turkey, Baser noticed an increase in 
the strength of national feelings following an escalation of conflicts in the 
home country. This was also reflected in the interactions occurring in desti-
nation countries such as Sweden and Germany (Baser, 2015: 169–206). The 
author carried out field research in these two countries among the second 
generation of migrants who have not expressed a willingness to return. So, 
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his aim was not to study to what extent the political circumstances moulded 
their national sentiments and connections to the territory at the time of mi-
gration.
Another two scholars, Šupule and Klave (2018) undertook a study of the 
impact of these components on Latvian returnees. They emphasised feel-
ings of belonging to the homeland as an important element of their motiva-
tion to return. These authors pointed to empirical evidence which indicated 
that feelings of belonging to a nation grew stronger at the times of major 
political events. For example, the respondents who were not living in Latvia 
during the referendum on accepting Russian as official language tried their 
best to engage in voting on the issue. In their understanding, this was not 
only a cultural matter, but also an issue of political relationships between 
the two states (Šupule and Klave, 2018). This is a strong argument demon-
strating why it is important to take into account structural settings, which is 
already emphasised in the introduction by citing Cassarino.
Having in mind the relevance of a social context to the formation of person-
al identity and potential investment in the homeland, the next chapter lays 
down the dynamics of social change in Serbian society at the times when 
our respondents were leaving and returning to the country.
SOCIAL CONTEXT
According to Cassarino and other above-cited structuralists, the compre-
hension of the identity of highly educated returnees in terms of the preser-
vation, strengthening, or, to the contrary, weakening of its national gradi-
ent, is very much linked to social contexts, both the actual one and the one 
they were moving out from and coming back to. Our oldest respondents left 
ex-SFRY, the state of relative economic well-being. State socialism spanned 
through years and decades, from the end of WWII up to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989. The latter event marked the implosion of socialist regimes all 
over Eastern Europe and their concomitant insertion into global capitalism. 
In the case of ex-SFRY, these processes were followed by armed conflicts in 
its territories.
In the years immediately after WWII, the communists, who emerged from 
the war as military winners, became political leaders of the federal state, al-
though without the support of the vast majority of the population (Antonić, 
2004: 24). Their legitimacy was based on their vision of industrialised, de-
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veloped and egalitarian society, which was fully in line with the prevailing 
ideals of egalitarianism in Serbia, as well as with ideas of a “demotic” and 
“protective” state (Antonić, 2004: 24–26). However, the first years of their 
government saw a mass wave of population emigration. It mostly involved 
soldiers, primarily from the territories where Serbs made up the autochtho-
nous population (Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Herzegovina and Bosnia). 
Not only was this period characterised by the mobility of Serbs living out 
of Serbia but it is also well-known for the emigration of anti-communists, 
who declined to return even after the collapse of the communist/social-
ist regimes by the end of the 1980s (Filipović, 2012; Bobić and Vesković 
Anđelković, 2015).
Extensive nationalisation of the economy was performed during the post-
WWII period by the new elite through the expropriation of the means of 
production (except for those belonging to small farmers and craftsmen). 
This act endorsed high investment in industry, which concurrently caused 
the demise of entire social strata. Such a course put SFRY on the track of ac-
celerated industrialisation. Nonetheless, as early as 1948, a major clash took 
part between the Yugoslav communists and the Soviet nomenklatura, mark-
ing a retreat from the Soviet model of socialist/communist regime.
In the case of SFRY, the confrontation contributed to the development of 
some specific features of the system and society. Still, very soon afterwards, 
SFRY faced a serious social and economic crisis, which was the result of 
a rebellion among farmers caused by a reduction in small farmland areas 
and the creation of agricultural cooperatives. Western states, most impor-
tantly the USA, initiated a programme of sending aid to Yugoslavia since 
they understood the huge geopolitical significance of president Tito’s con-
flict with Stalin. Aiming to obtain continuous assistance from the West, 
Yugoslav authorities commenced the establishment of certain institutional 
and legitimacy patterns contrary to those of the Soviet regime. As a conse-
quence, a distinctive model of Yugoslav workers’ self-management social-
ism emerged, with elements of the market economy and a relatively liberal 
political regime partly open to the West (Lazić, 2011; Lazić and Pešić, 2012).
Increasing economic and political openness towards the West permitted 
both a relatively free exchange of ideas and goods and unrestricted mobility 
of people across national borders.2 Population emigration at the times was 
mostly motivated by economic needs (Antonijević, 2011; Filipović, 2012). 
2 “Liberal” Yugoslav socialism gave space to strong social criticism in the fields of science 
and culture, which was followed by a low level of repression.
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However, already during that period, the share of unemployment was not 
low despite the relative material well-being. On the other hand, salaries 
were still below Western ones, although higher compared to other socialist 
countries.
Emigrants from Serbia were manual workers prompted by a need to en-
hance the material status of their households. They searched for jobs, most 
frequently settling in Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Sweden. That is why these states, together with overseas ones, are home to 
the vast majority of the Serbian diaspora today. After retirement or even 
earlier, when their savings would increase sufficiently to allow for a start 
of business or some other purpose, a substantial share of these migrants re-
turned to Serbia. Due to the initial temporariness of their labour migration, 
they were commonly named “guest workers” (in German “der Gastarbeiter”). 
When it comes to the mobility of highly educated citizens from Serbia and 
former Yugoslavia, their number was minor, as a result of both their lower 
share in the general population and their confidence in local tertiary educa-
tion and the social system.
The partial openness to Western Europe and North America, as well as the 
specificity of Yugoslav socialism, laid the ground for convictions that the 
country would easily and quickly transform itself into a market economy 
by the end of the 1980s. The so-called post-socialist transformation repre-
sents the process of “reintegration of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries into the capitalist (world) system” (Lazić, 2005: 122). It presupposes 
the acceptance of democratic values and institutions and revitalisation of 
market economy mechanisms.
Despite expectations, this process was quite prolonged and stalled in Serbia. 
The reasons should be sought in the particular model of structural transfor-
mation. More precisely, political and economic dominance was exercised 
by the groups originating directly from the previous generation of socialist 
leadership. Not only were those new/old elites unaware of the necessity 
of abandoning state socialism but they also strongly opposed any change 
whatsoever, which obstructed the transition to a capitalist social and po-
litical system. This process of blocked post-socialist transformation is de-
fined as “a social movement set off by totalised social monopoly exerted by 
the previous class of socialist, collective-ownership leadership, which was 
replaced by the mutually enforcing economic and political domination of 
virtually identical social groups, whose aim was to postpone the ongoing 
instalment of the market economy and political competition” (Lazić, 2005: 
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123). That was a period of extremely harsh economic and political condi-
tions, marked by isolation and sanctions from the international community, 
as well as by armed conflicts on ex-Yugoslav territories.
Besides the forced population migration inside ex-Yugoslav republics, 
these times were also known for the mass emigration of a huge portion of 
highly educated people. They were prompted to leave Serbia due to forced 
military mobilisations, unwilling to take part in armed conflicts between 
ex-Yugoslav republics, and wishing to improve the quality of their lives. It 
was in the 1990s when the largest share of highly educated people left Ser-
bia.3 At the same time, a significant number of those who emigrated in the 
1970s and 1980s to improve their knowledge and expertise decided to come 
back and settle in Serbia despite the hardships. They were driven by various 
incentives, including the national ones.
The “de-blockage” of the post-socialist transformation started with the po-
litical opposition winning the local elections in 1996/1997 and ended in 2000 
with the collapse of Milošević’s regime (Lazić, 2005; Lazić and Pešić, 2012). 
Already by the end of 1995, after the Dayton agreement had been signed, 
bringing an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sanctions were im-
posed against Serbia. This event marked the opening of Serbia to the West, 
which immediately facilitated economic emigration as a result of the pre-
vailingly low standard in Serbia, which additionally deteriorated after the 
bombing by the NATO alliance in 1999.
Expectations rose among ordinary people after Milošević’s overthrowing 
at the end of 2000. After the end of his decade-long domination, Serbia was 
quickly admitted back into the international community, with sanctions be-
ing fully removed. Financial aid was provided, sparking anticipation of a 
speedy economic recovery and stabilisation of the socio-political system. 
The new political elite in Serbia posed the priority goal of normalisation of 
capitalism. That meant: “stabilisation of the political system (introducing 
the principles of fair political competition), establishing legal order, ensur-
ing institutional warrants for market principles in the economy and inclu-
sion in the global system (economic, political, legal and cultural)” (Lazić, 
2014: 25). However, very soon it became evident that Serbia was turning 
away from the “ideal type” of capitalism (the most developed countries 
or “core” ones being closest to it). That was best reflected in the Serbian 
3 According to census data, in 2002, there were 34.380 people from Serbia with tertiary 
education who settled abroad, whereas their number was even higher in 2011 (41.185) 
(Predojević Despić, 2015: 159).
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economy. The state and the public sector retained a significant place in the 
economy, thus preserving not only a regulatory but also a direct economic 
role.4 In the reference literature, such a deviation from the classic model of 
capitalism in the long-term process of its inauguration is named “consolida-
tion of the capitalist model” (Lazić, 2014; Lazić and Pešić, 2012).
Regardless of these aberrations from the core countries, Serbia was soon 
faced with a profoundly different attitude of the West, compared to that of 
the end of the previous century, especially in the first years after Milošević’s 
fall. That was mirrored in the new approach of members of the European 
Union and the “strategy of accession”, followed by an influx of donors’ as-
sistance to support the interior process of transformation in Serbia.
Additionally, higher foreign investments and international trade contrib-
uted to an enhancing living standard for a part of the domestic popula-
tion (the so-called “winners” of the transformation – urban, better-educated 
professionals). “Macro-economic stabilisation, price liberalisation and eco-
nomic recovery went hand in hand with the credit-driven, consumer-led 
economic growth, largely funded by foreign capital inflows (including for-
eign loans and workers’ remittances, but also direct foreign investments)” 
(Uvalić, 2010, in: Lazić and Pešić, 2012: 55).
Still, “the ordinary man in Serbia remained discontented” (Antonić, 2004: 
33) as a result of unmet expectations of a fast rise of the quality of life that 
would reach at least the level of Tito’s times (especially in the 1970s). The 
economy was very slow and hard to recover, while living conditions re-
mained poor, particularly when compared to Yugoslav state socialism or 
Western lifestyle. The situation was further exacerbated after 2008 with the 
onset of the world economic crisis that caused a drastic decrease in direct 
foreign aid and investments, an increase in unemployment and poverty in 
the country, as well as the accumulation of private and public debts (Lazić, 
2014: 27).
The social setting in Serbia after 2000 influenced the migration of the highly 
educated population in a two-fold way. On the one hand, many members of 
the highly educated diaspora returned to the homeland, feeling encouraged 
to support auspicious, appealing changes. Their inclusion in the processes 
of social transformation was recognised and approved by their incorpo-
ration into a new elite class of politicians and experts (e.g. Zoran Đinđić, 
Božidar Đelić, Radovan Jelašić, Lazar Krstić, etc.).
4 The banking system was almost the only one entirely transferred to foreign owners.
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However, persevering problems in the administrative and legal system, un-
developed policies toward returnees, as well as the mentioned persistently 
difficult living conditions for the vast majority of the population, prompt-
ed many to leave the country again. Such a situation, including the ever-
present challenges of the education system, has constituted “push” factors 
for the current emigration of the highly educated youth (Bobić, Vesković 
Anđelković and Kokotović Kanazir, 2016).
Last but not least, emigration from Serbia has been encouraged by im-
migration policies of developed countries, which embarked on a “strug-
gle for talents”, i.e. attracting young people through fellowships, projects, 
various programmes, etc. To sum up, although the dawn of the new mil-
lennium was marked by a high number of returns, primarily of those who 
were ready to participate in structural reforms occurring after 2000, the fact 
is that the highly educated Serbian diaspora, already numerous, has been 
continuously growing due to the constant emigration of young profession-
als (Mojić and Petrović, 2013; Bobić, Vesković Anđelković and Kokotović 
Kanazir, 2016).
METHODOLOGY
The fieldwork embraced several techniques and sources of data collection 
(primary and secondary). However, the present analysis of the identity 
of returnees is only founded on the qualitative study carried out using 
semi-structured interviews. The sample was created using quotas – the 
respondents were selected among highly educated returnees, aged 30–65, 
irrespective of their gender. The main principle of their selection was set 
out according to the presented delineation of phases of social transfor-
mation in Serbia. Such a choice was also motivated by the wish to un-
dertake comparative research on the influence of different structural fac-
tors. Therefore, the informants fitted into three different groups: the first 
one, made up of those who returned already under Milošević’s regime 
(1989–2000), the second one, encompassing those who came back between 
the political change in 2000 and the onset of the world economic crisis in 
2008, and the third one, covering migrants who have returned since 2008 
to the present.
The first group consisted of 18 informants; 10 men and 8 women. The 
second encompassed 14 returnees – 8 men and 6 women, while the third 
one included 15 highly educated returnees; 9 women and 6 men. The ter-
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ritorial distribution was not set out in advance, but it turned out that most 
interviewees came from Belgrade. A vast majority, as many as 39, left the 
country for the sake of further education, five to reunite with family, and 
as few as three left for work-related reasons. Most of them, 39, completed 
undergraduate studies in Serbia, whereas five obtained a Ph.D. in Ser-
bia. All of them left the country to enrol in further education, take part 
in a research project, or teach as a guest lecturer at some of the world 
universities. The largest number, 15, headed to the USA (most often the 
respondents who left before 2000), eight went to Canada (again, pre-
vailingly those who left before Milošević’s fall), whereas one spent part 
of his life in China, one in Australia, one in Russia, and the rest, 22, in 
some of the countries of the European Union, most often France (8) and 
Germany (6).
The main objective of the entire research was to explore the possibilities 
and readiness of returnees to actively participate in the social progress of 
Serbia, especially as brokers between the homeland and academic diaspo-
ra, efficiently and effectively directing their disposable resources amassed 
while staying abroad. One of the explicable objectives was to assess the 
sentiments related to national identity, implying that such sentiments 
possess a mobilising power when it comes to investments (Nielsen and 
Riddle, 2007; Filipović, 2012). This led to the idea that one part of the col-
lected data would serve the purpose of analysing the respondents’ iden-
tity formation.
While designing the protocol of the interview, the recreation of identity 
was conceptualised as an ongoing process. The initial hypothesis based 
on the above conceptual discussion reads that the identity of migrants/
returnees is a fusion of national identity and influences of societies they 
have been living in. Accordingly, the respondents shared their answers to 
several questions.
Firstly, it was important to comprehend national identity, which was opera-
tionalised in the interview by posing the following question: “What does 
national identity mean to you?” It aimed to explore whether and to what 
extent the cultural, political and territorial components were recognised 
by interlocutors as important elements of national identity. The following 
question was asked to understand their view on the effect of migration on 
identity formation and its alteration: “Having lived in another society with 
different rules, values, culture… what has changed, if anything, in your 
personal identity?”. It was valuable to assess the impact of different cus-
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toms, behaviours, cultural norms and languages on identity formation and 
change over time.
Finally, the intensity of national identity in various phases of the migration 
process was examined by asking the following three questions: “Did you 
find this sentiment stronger while living out of Serbia or upon return?”, 
“What were your feelings when you finally came back?”, “Has anything 
changed in your understanding of personal and group identity?”. It is im-
portant to stress that the focus was placed on respondents’ personal views 
on the effect of various cultures and living in different states on self-iden-
tity. Thus, this was not a comparative study of different groups – the di-
aspora, non-migrants, and returnees. Instead, the results only concern the 
returnees, since, at the time of preparing this paper, the research of another 
two groups was not completed yet.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The notion of identity used in the analysis of the collected data is related to 
personal feelings and performance (Brubaker, 2004). Individual conscious-
ness is reflected in the understanding of one’s own identity on one hand, 
and sentiments of belonging on the other. If a sense of belonging does not 
exist, there is no identity but identification instead (Golubović, 1999). The 
present paper examined group or collective identity taking into account 
the fact of preservation and even strengthening of national identity in the 
current age of globalisation. It was important to capture a potential change 
in the meanings of national identity under the influence of present-day 
society.
First and foremost, it is interesting to underline that almost half of the in-
terviewees (19) did not respond to the question of how they perceived na-
tional identity. The replies revolved around a statement on their belonging 
to groups such as family, close friends, and professional organisations or 
even migrant groups. Still, one should bear in mind that even though some 
respondents did not wish to comment on national identity, or denied any 
national component in their personal feelings of belonging, later in the in-
terview they did speak about the emotional connection to Serbia in terms 
of relatedness to its people, way of life and institutions. This can be under-
stood as a consequence of individualisation, which is one of the most salient 
features of the contemporary world, stemming from the plurality of choices 
and chances, and social networking. A female respondent said:
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I am definitely not a nationalist, because I have always considered myself a 
citizen of the world. But there are friends and family who relate me to Serbia 
mostly. (R. J., female, 35, lived in France, 2006–2012)5
Here, the territorial component is evident in the discourse of the interlocu-
tor. Other than that, one may also observe the confusion of the concept of 
national identity with nationalism as an ideology. The latter is treated as a 
disadvantage nowadays since it is seen as the core of all conflicts in inter-
national relationships. Still, this national ingredient was noticed in almost 
all respondents, even though some of them did not admit it explicitly. Simi-
larly, some other interviewees talked about national identity with disgust, 
although it could be traced in their overall discourse:
National identity? Well, that nationalist ideology almost killed us! How luckier 
we would have been had it never existed. (R. M., male, 58, Canada, 1994–2005)
However, a little later, the same interlocutor demonstrated outstanding at-
tachment to Serbia in both a territorial and cultural sense. He continued:
You do not become Canadian merely by living in Canada. I cannot be happy 
there if I have to do the same things they do. Then, the climate does not fit me ei-
ther… So, I walk around Vancouver and think about Babušnica [a small town 
at the southeast of Serbia] – April, violets, birds, sitting with my childhood 
friend and drinking brandy. And Djurdjevdan is coming soon [slava6]. That 
was a big holiday when I was little. These are the things I was thinking about. 
(R. M., male, 58, Canada, 1994–2005).
Unlike the respondents who refused to even reflect on national identity7 at 
the beginning of the interview, others offered very precise statements clear-
ly showing their national loyalty. Here stands out the narrative of a female 
informant who was not even born in Serbia, but whose discourse is fully in 
line with the so-called “demotic” model of national identity, highlighting 
the cultural component: 
What makes me Serbian is the language, religion, tradition, and that is that 
… I have a half-sister who is not Serbian, but when she comes here, she has to 
5 When citing parts of the interviews with respondents, only their initials are noted to-
gether with the country where they lived and the respective length of their stay.
6 Slava is a Serbian Orthodox Christian tradition of the ritual glorification of one's family’s 
patron saint. The family celebrates the Slava annually on the saint's feast day (authors’ 
note, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slava, (23th June, 2018).
7 This might be the result of the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia and the specific, concomi-
tant problems reflected in the interior and foreign policies of the Republic of Serbia re-
lated to its national identity – e.g. Kosovo as a clear example.
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eat pasulj [famous national dish – beans]. Slava has to be celebrated. (S. A., 
female, 40, born in France, returned to the homeland in 2002)
The following interviewee expresses the transnational identity of migrants, 
constituting a sum of roots and routes, i.e. national identity modified 
through relationships with people in other societies, whereas national iden-
tity mainly seals individual identity:
You see… I observe a human being from the aspect of identity and technological 
parts. The first is the one which changes very slowly and cannot be induced. For 
me, there are accumulated things which do not alter, practically, it is hard to 
assume that some people change at all, maybe only in some fragments, but yes, 
it is something... I would say, if I had gone to America as a Serb and received 
a Ph.D. there and become someone else, then it would not be me anymore, not 
the person I had struggled for, it would be some other person, not myself. (J. F., 
male, 55, USA, 1988–1994)
Still, unlike the majority of respondents, who more or less explicitly ex-
pressed a connection to the homeland in general or a local community in 
particular, a minority of them declared that origin did not have any effect 
on their identity. They are classified as those who built hybrid identities in 
a somewhat extreme form. Here is an example:
Regardless of your religion or nation, you [authors’ emphasis] are the site 
where your character has been moulded. You might be named Nikola Petrović, 
but if you were raised in Canada, you are Canadian. And vice versa. Society and 
the setting produce a great impact on you. That stems from your surroundings. 
I am proud of what I have become, I do not adhere to any extremes... I am always 
ready to defend my position with arguments, what I am and who I am. (M. M., 
male, 30, USA, 2012–2016)
Likewise, a female respondent says:
I grew up in some parallel universe and that, national identity, I identify with 
a group of my friends, because I spent a lot of time elaborating my inquisitive-
ness. Although I come from a small place, without any industry, any hope, my 
national identity has often gained some other features and has been directed 
towards those people who shared similar interests. Some sort of polarisation – I 
see it also in social media [she spoke about Facebook], people often think as if, 
that national identity is very fluid. (M. M., female, 31, Germany, 2010–2012)
The interpretation of the results indicates that younger respondents assign 
less importance to national identity compared to the older ones. As time 
passes by, however, the feeling of belonging seems to intensify:
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But what I can give as a conclusion after some years of thinking, and since I am 
getting “older”, the sentiment of belonging to a nation and national identity 
have been reinforced, have become something sound, affirmative and not aggres-
sive. For a long time, I thought that it was the consequence of living abroad, but 
now I think I was not right. (A. M., male, 31, Germany, 2012–2016)
Pushing aside and even neglecting national identity may be understood as 
a result of information technology and wide access to cheap transportation, 
which diminish the sense of nostalgia as one of the main components of 
group (national) identity. Secondly, one should take into consideration the 
relative political stabilisation of Serbia at the times when younger cohorts 
were leaving and returning. It seems that they missed a strong basis for the 
burgeoning of national sentiments, as had been the case with older cohorts, 
who had moved out in the 1990s.
It was at those times of warfare here, then, that the feeling was the strongest. (M. 
M., male, 58, France, 1989–1994)
In the times of turbulence and crisis in Serbia, the political element of na-
tional identity gained its importance, with feelings of ”otherness” becom-
ing more emphasised, not infrequently followed by anxiety and paranoia:
While living abroad, I was in a very unpleasant situation because it was at the 
time when Kosovo… [unilaterally claimed autonomy and independence 
from Serbia]… when those decisions were being made in the European Parlia-
ment. I had rows with people, especially Swedes whom I knew, who thought that 
we were all war criminals, and you had to defend yourself, willingly or unwill-
ingly. Americans were not nice either, all of those who grew up watching CNN. 
(M. M., female, 40, Italy and Belgium, 2002–2008)
When there were wars here and when we were presented on CNN as animals, I 
felt as if I was facing discrimination. I hardly made up my mind to take an exam. 
And then I came and he [the professor] saw that it was written there that I was 
from Yugoslavia and he asked me if I was maybe a Serb or Croat. Then I under-
stood that they only minded their own business. (V. B., male, 57, Australia).
However, regardless of the situation in Serbia and the age of our respond-
ents, they still felt different when comparing themselves to people at the 
destination:
You start doing things in a different way. You need to enter the social circle. 
People are much more reserved there. It was not easy. A long time passes before 
someone asks you to come and have a coffee at his/her home,… On the other 
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side, their bureaucracy is completely different, and indeed you need some time 
to come to terms. When you are alone in some foreign country, it is also a kind 
of a challenge. There are also obvious cultural differences because they are more 
restrained. My sincerity was incorrectly understood there, especially by young 
men. In the beginning, everyone called me using “You” [in French]. Of course, 
as time went by, Frenchmen became somewhat warmer, but it was not the case 
at the beginning of my studies. I think that it is some distance which is not fa-
vourable among students. But still, I kept something of my Southern mentality. 
(R. J., female, 34, France, 2006–2012)
Well, you are actually always a foreigner, but you have to accommodate and to 
feel pleasant. Language is also a big barrier. Before I started speaking Italian, I 
did not have friends. I had one girlfriend who worked for my husband and was 
80 years old, she was the only one I got around to at the beginning. I felt that I 
did not belong to that society for a long time. That bonding was not fantastic, a 
lot of time had to pass. It was by far easier in Italy compared to Belgium, because 
Belgians are much colder, especially the Flemish. (M. M., female, 40, Italy and 
Belgium, 2002–2008)
Regardless of the sense of exclusion, most respondents were not interested 
in socialising with the Serbian diaspora. This is especially the case with the 
youth:
Well no, not at all, I had no wish to chase our people there. I could have done 
that here, in Belgrade. That idea was worthless for me... I had actually left Serbia 
because I wished for something new, both the environment and people. (A. M., 
30, England and Italy, 2014–2016)
However, one respondent, who returned to Serbia during the peak of the 
crisis in the 1990s, had a completely different experience:
It was important to me that there were our people. You know when you yearn 
for everything and then you happen to hear Serbian. And you cook sarma and 
pasulj [famous Serbian dishes]. We did all that. These “others” [citizens of 
different nationalities] were all around and yes, I did mingle with them, too. 
But it is not the same. My heart is full when I know that we are all the same. (A. 
V., male, 59, USA, 1984–1998)
When looking from a generational perspective, we can recognise another 
regularity –the integration of the national component into personal identity 
constituted an incentive to return, primarily among older respondents, who 
had left Serbia before the collapse of the socialist state of Yugoslavia:
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Personal identity is one of the reasons why I came back, and I wished to find out 
where my roots were. (D. N., female, 44, Germany, 1987–2007)
Yet, younger interviewees, who travelled abroad, supported by either some 
programme, such as Erasmus or some foreign organisation, very often had 
to return after their fellowships expired. They all emphasise subsistence as 
a key motif:
I have returned after completing my Master’s degree in France and I was 
lucky that a position was opened here at the faculty and I got the job … You 
know, you receive resources for your work there and intellectual support from 
the leading people in your field, but it is not easy to find a job. The competi-
tion is tough. And they have the practice to admit their own people first, and 
others afterwards, provided there are still some vacancies. (R. J., female, 34, 
France, 2006–2012)
Well no, I had no intention to stay there. I did not have a job. Here, I ar-
rived and gained a certain position. (A. M., male, 30, England and Italy, 
2014–2016)
None of the respondents underscored “otherness” in terms of full differ-
entiation from non-migrants when it comes to national identity. At the 
same time, they still acknowledged that living abroad had changed their 
personalities. Whether they spent time with members of the Serbian dias-
pora or not, they claimed that they shared common sentiments related to 
the nation.
With me personally, a lot of things have changed. Well, you know, everything 
is so individual, few people return, the majority stays, I cannot speak for the 
latter. But regarding those who came back, it is all up to an individual and 
depends on people; perhaps you become more mature as a person, you find 
yourself somewhere where you don’t feel familiar… I underwent a crisis, but 
you are not the only one to go through that… and so you come to understand 
that all of us are made up of the same stuff. (J. M., female, 52, Switzerland, 
2000–2006)
Although all our informants perceive identity in a somewhat different way 
compared to Serbians who have never moved out, none of the migrants/
returnees was keen to deny the contribution of non-mobiles to the preserva-
tion of national identity.
Someone had to stay and look after Serbian universities while we were there. (J. 
F., male, 55, USA, 1988–1994)
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The research confirms the social constructivist viewpoint according to 
which the identity of returnees has been moulded through the active inter-
action between the national culture and customs and those of the destina-
tion countries. Nevertheless, the national element is not equally emphasised 
– it is least recognised among the narratives of younger respondents. This 
could be interpreted as an impact of globalisation, widespread electronic 
media and the culture ascribing a negative connotation to the individual 
nation. Yet, this explorative research has demonstrated that even the young 
informants quote national elements when describing their personal senti-
ments.
It seems that the most important is the territorial component, vastly reflect-
ed in the feelings of belonging to a local community and usually restricted 
to families and friends. Quite a small number of respondents did not refer 
to any tradition, language, or custom adopted in the family of origin, which 
indicates that the cultural component makes the largest contribution to the 
preservation of national identity. The dominance of the cultural element 
varied depending on both the actual place of living and the social, economic 
and political conditions at the homeland. This was especially pronounced 
while respondents were living abroad and it grew stronger in times of cri-
sis. This suggests a strong influence of the political factor on the persever-
ance of national identity.
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the more socially included the 
respondents were at the destination, the less significant their national iden-
tity was. As we could see from the interviews, national identity is at the core 
of the sense of personal belonging for the respondents who left the country 
in the 1990s, when there were armed conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and when 
living in Serbia was extremely harsh due to the economic breakdown and 
sanctions imposed by powerful Western states. Their discourse reflected 
a rebellion sparked by the media campaigns against Serbs, which in turn 
reinforced the national element.
The respondents’ age, as well as the time when they had left the country, 
were also significant when discussing similarity with the Serbian diaspora. 
The informants who had left and lived abroad earlier were mostly inter-
ested in getting along with expatriates, whereas the younger respondents, 
having left recently through exchange programmes and short-term fellow-
ships, steered clear of Serbs at the destination. Nevertheless, this fact does 
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not deny their sentiments of belonging but stresses the need to expand their 
social capital beyond the national frontiers.
Last but not least, it seems important to stress that the respondents very 
often underlined that national identity had been the main reason behind 
their return. Still, many were “pushed” back due to the expiration of fellow-
ships and the inability to find a job. However, this research did not show 
that the returnees who do not emphasise components of national identity 
differ strongly from non-migrants. All our informants pointed out that the 
experiences of mobility had vastly changed them and provided them with 
a lot of benefits, but they also expressed an appreciation for non-migrants 
who stayed and preserved the Serbian culture and institutions.
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SAŽETAK
U radu se predstavljaju rezultati istraživanja na temelju intervjua s pedeset visoko-
obrazovanih povratnika u Srbiji, provedenog 2017. Osnovni cilj bio je da se analizi-
raju i razumiju osobni i grupni identiteti građana Srbije s migracijskim iskustvom. 
Autorice su primijenile dvije konceptualne paradigme: prvu, primordijalnu – koja 
pretpostavlja da migranti u potpunosti čuvaju nacionalni identitet, bez obzira na 
to što su izloženi utjecaju različitih kultura, običaja i vrijednosti u mjestima odre-
dišta; drugu – socijalnokonstruktivističku, koja je dalje podijeljena na dvije linije 
razmišljanja. Prva pretpostavlja da migranti zadržavaju nacionalni identitet kao 
»tvrdu jezgru«, koja je, doduše, u stalnom procesu mijenjanja i preoblikovanja usli-
jed uključivanja migranata u transnacionalne veze, a druga implicira da migranti 
grade hibridne identitete, koji su u permanentnom kretanju jer ispitanici nisu uko-
rijenjeni ni u jednoj posebnoj kulturi. Interpretacija rezultata pokazuje da većina 
visokoobrazovanih migranata povratnika izgrađuje hibridne identitete. To znači 
da društvo i kultura u mjestima odredišta imaju značajan učinak, no ipak se čuvaju 
nacionalni korijeni. To se ogleda u njihovu snažnom osjećaju nacionalne pripadno-
sti. Tumačenje ovog nalaza povezano je s dva glavna razloga. Nacionalni identitet 
ne može ostati nepromijenjen procesom uključivanja ispitanika u obrazovni sustav 
u inozemstvu i građenja veza s visokoobrazovanim slojevima širom svijeta. Usto, 
sama činjenica konzerviranja nacionalnog identiteta svakako je utjecala na njihov 
povratak i uključivanje u razvoj matične nacionalne države, bez obzira na veliko 
zaostajanje Srbije u socijalnom i ekonomskom razvoju u odnosu na njihove države 
emigracije. Rezultati su također otkrili da visokoobrazovani povratnici ne uviđaju 
naročite razlike u nacionalnim osjećajima pripadnosti u odnosu na sunarodnjake 
koji nemaju migracijsko iskustvo, dok iste te razlike primjećuju u odnosu na pri-
padnike srpske dijaspore. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: identitet, dijaspora, transnacionalizam, visokoobrazovani povrat-
nici, Srbija

